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A LINKAGE OF MIND AND BRAIN: TOWARDS TRANSLATIONAL VALIDITY 
BETWEEN NEUROBIOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY
Drozdstoj Stoyanov 
Medical University, Plovdiv, Bulgaria and University of Pittsburgh, USA
Aim: There are prominent discrepancies in the general approaches of psychology and psychiatry, many of them due to diverse 
and incompatible tacit positions on the mind-brain debate (MBD). For this reason we need to enhance the dialogue with neuro-
sciences and other human sciences relevant to the problems of psychopathology. To achieve such goal we can reduce the level 
of diversity of mind-brain problem project-solutions as implied in different theoretical models and practices.  
Arguments: I shall trace the MBD to the one of the most relevant for the modern psychopathology areas: the group of neurosciences. 
We seek the interference of the philosophical assumptions, the evidence of neuroscience and the development of psychopathol-
ogy. We prove by a post rem analysis that the reduced group of predominant project-solutions of MBD excludes genuine forms 
of dualism and extreme forms of physicalism (like epiphenomenalism or eliminative materialism).  
Conclusion: A predominant group of project-solutions is adopted including complementary combination of  contemporary forms 
of physicalism: identity theory of mind applied to mental events and brain processes; supervenience principle applied to other 
mental phenomena. Biomed Rev 2011; 22: 65-76.
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INTRODUCTION
What are we concerned about?
I shall attempt to raise two conceptual issues in this Dance 
round. The first of them is how a tacit position in the mind-brain 
debate reflects the actual knowledge in disciplines concerned 
in mental health (psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience). 
The second issue is that of connectivity or translation between 
levels/domains of determination in respect the explanation of 
mental disorder. Both issues are antecedent or ante rem to a 
greater extent because an „anticipative“ position in the mind-
brain debate is implied in any kind of research or practice in 
mental health as inextricable though sometimes tacit predispo-
sition. However it is also post rem or consequent, because the 
WE DANCE ROUND IN A RING AND SUPPOSE,
BUT THE SECRET SITS IN THE MIDDLE AND KNOWS.
ROBERT FROST
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translation between levels of determination of psyche is a result 
of further interpretation of data, acquired in certain disciplinary 
domains and under different paradigmatic frameworks. The 
data of psychology, neuroscience etc. related fields is liable 
or not to transdisciplinary translation depending not on the 
evidence as it is but on the cognitive attitude to it. This is to 
say that similar as a cognitive content scientific data depend on 
the interpretation „angle“ which, in turn is determined by the 
previously mentioned „preliminary“ position in the mind-brain 
debate (MBD). Given data along with its theoretical rationale 
is incorporated in a ‚patchy way‘ into the disciplinary matrices 
of psychology, psychiatry and neurosciences. Then in a kind of 
circularity data post rem presupposes a philosophical position 
and also might justify / criticize it.
Such divergent and incoherent ‘piecemeal’ mental health 
knowledge fails to meet the criteria of scientific discipline, 
prescribed by the normative functions of psychiatry and 
psychology (1). That is why there is desperate need for 
transdisciplinary convergence of the views in the arena of 
mental health in order to facilitate the empirical convergence 
of the data emerging in different disciplinary domains. For 
instance, modern psychoanalysis makes an effort to develop 
non-classical dualist position; the gestalt psychology holds 
some peculiar variation of quasi-materialism, called “psycho 
physical isomorphism”; biological psychiatry is governed by 
eliminative materialism and so forth, as different traditions in 
respect to MBD imply contradictory approaches the diagnostic 
assessment and treatment in mental health, such as biological 
medication or psychoanalytic psychotherapy. So when they 
define a term like ‘paranoia’ or ‘depression’ or ‘anxiety’ they 
practically imply diverse and incompatible theoretical back-
grounds. This was actually the reason for Carl Gustav Hempel 
and Robert Spitzer’s escape into instrumental and operational 
taxonomy of DSM proclaimed to be ‘atheoretical’. 
I intend to present another resolution to the translational 
issue driven from more conformable and pragmatic approach 
to MBD. Eventually my claim will be that once we establish 
translational bridge laws between the domains of mentality 
and neural processes without specific polarization towards 
reduction or emergence, it may facilitate the cross-validation 
of the terms, notions and methods across different levels of ex-
planation. In this context my intention is to state that this kind 
of inter-level vertical relationships is actually undermining the 
possibility of the conformable dialogue and will propose a kind 
of ‘horizontal’ complementary model which in my perspective 
is predisposed by a revised form of the identity theory of mind.
Historical background of MBD: a non-conventional 
epistemological perspective
In this section I shall apply the divergent-convergent method of 
Polikarov to the subject of MBD (2,3). There are several rea-
sons for me to believe it is relevant to the topics posed herein: 
(i) as it will be demonstrated herewith MBD has evolved ac-
cording to the divergent-convergent model, similarly to many 
other major problems in history of science, (ii) if considered 
in the context of convergence of the field of possible project 
solutions, the data of neuroscience (though sometimes con-
troversial) delineate one major trend: towards formulation of 
a predominant group of materialist monism views (solutions 
of the MBP), and (iii) according to the empirical as well as 
meta-empirical evidence, the metamorphoses of dualism are 
false as well as some radical forms of the reductive physical-
ism (e.g. eliminative materialism or epiphenomenalism), and 
one plausible position might be outlined in a revised form of 
the identity theory of mind.
Azarya Polikarov (1921-2000) was an eminent philosopher 
of science in the XX century. One of the most significant and 
enduring of Polikarov’s contributions is the introduction of the 
divergent-convergent method (DCM). It was published in 1973 
in the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, formulated 
as the “heuristic approach to problem- solving”.  According to 
DCM scientific problems are penetrated on two stages. At the 
first an extensive (divergent) “field of possible solutions” is for-
mulated, some of them only hypothetical, others better supported 
by available data. At the second stage the field is “reduced” (or 
converged) to a more restricted area of “predominant group of 
project-solutions”. The mechanism of convergence is usually 
logical and meta-empirical, i.e. based on scientific evidence. 
Polikarov defines two variations of predominant project solu-
tion: ultimate and alternative. The alternative type is subdivided 
into combined solutions with higher level of diversity (including 
radically alternative), and respectively lower level of diversity. 
DCM is still respected as a methodology of scientific pluralism 
(though the genuine focus of Polikarov was on heuristics) and its 
features of critical appraisal make it relevant to meta-empirical, 
theoretical and meta-theoretical studies. 
Divergent-convergent method was recently adopted in the 
study of the mind-brain problem in psychology and psychiatry. 
I decided to combine the method of historical reconstruction 
and DCM in the analysis of the evolution of the mind brain 
debate. It is well known that a large number of diverse and 
sometimes radically alternative solutions of the mind - brain 
problem have been proposed in many scientific traditions: 
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psychoanalysis, behaviorism, neurophysiology, cognitive 
neuroscience, philosophy of language and mind. Some of 
these formulations are pure theoretical constructs; others are 
more empirical, i.e. supported by observable experimental 
or clinical data.  Nevertheless the incoherence of the whole 
field, or the dominance of certain “monopolistic” solutions of 
the mind-brain problem, turned out to be a major source of 
shortcomings and controversies arising in the real practice and 
expertise in many professional areas concerned with neurosci-
ence and mental health.
I aimed at reconstructing the debate at two historical 
and epistemological stages. In the stage of diversifica-
tion (XVII-XIX century) the preliminary field of possible 
solutions was spanning from materialist monism to the 
different prototypes of dualism: Cartesian interactionism, 
psycho-physical parallelism and other minor bifurcations. 
My further analysis indicated that during the historical 
period of the most extensive mind-brain debate (end of 
XIX - beginning of XX century) a number of revolutionary 
changes of paradigms emerged, both in mental sciences 
and neurosciences. Worth mentioning are the neuronal 
doctrine of Ramon-y-Cajal, chemical neuro-mediation, 
functional and experimental neurosurgery  synaptic ultra-
structure and functional plasticity, behaviorist discoveries 
neuro-psychoanalysis, etc. These trends delivered evidence 
which made possible the “program integration” agenda of 
neuroscience and the medical branches of psychology, re-
spectively psychopathology. This integration was promoted 
in Francis Crick’s doctrine (4). I regarded this process as 
ipso facto convergence of the initial field of possible solu-
tions of the mind brain problem to a reduced field of actually 
physicalist predominant group of project solutions. I have 
delineated two combined predominant groups according to 
the method of Polikarov.  The one with higher level of diver-
sity includes all contemporary variations of the materialist 
monism. The other, with lower level of diversity focuses 
on two influential types of physicalism: reductive and non-
reductive. The main representatives of the reductive trend 
are the Australian Identity Group, eliminative materialis 
and epiphenomenalism. The non-reductive physicalism is 
represented in the supervenience theory, anomalous mon-
ism, and partly in the dual-aspect monism (see 20).
ARGUMENT
My core argument is divided into two counterparts. In the first 
I shall delineate the state-of-the-art in the area of the predomi-
nant group of project-solutions of MBP as configured in the 
DCM analysis from the first section of this essay. The second 
counterpart will engage with the story of the bridging laws as 
moderators in the MBD in respect to the utmost necessity in 
translational dialogue across disciplines in mental health (5).
Rendering dualism as significant: metaphysical vs. 
empirical significance
I shall adopt here the argumentation against modern dualism 
as elaborated by Kenneth Kendler in his fundamental paper 
for American Journal of Psychiatry (6). Kendler asserts that:
“We need to reject definitively the belief that mind and 
brain reflect two fundamentally different and ultimately 
incommensurable kinds of “stuff.” Rather, in accord with an 
overwhelming degree of clinical and scientific evidence, 
we should conclude that the human firstperson world of 
subjective experience emerges from and is entirely de-
pendent upon brain functioning. The mental world does 
not exist independently of its physical instantiation in the 
brain. To reject Cartesian dualism … means to no longer 
consider the mental (or functional) to be fundamentally 
different thing from the biological (or organic). Rather, 
the mental and the biological become different ways of 
viewing and/or different levels of analysis of the mind-
brain system”
Most of the other forms of the dualistic attempts have been 
falsified by natural evidence and are no more than intellectual 
speculations in respect to the scientific effort to explain and 
manage mental disorders. In this context my claim is that 
psychophysical dualism plays still an important metaphysical 
role only as a subject for meditations in both analytic and con-
tinental philosophy. On the other hand dualism is undeniably 
suspended with the data of neuroscience. It seems obvious 
that besides Sir John Eccles more than forty years ago, there 
is no other scientist from the field of empirical science to any 
more hold the position of dualism. At the same time dualism 
does not help to resolve and manage problems of the real 
people. And philosophy of psychiatry as it was conceived by 
Bill Fulford aims at the philosophy-into-practice perspective, 
i.e. a program to improve the mental health of the real people. 
The type identity theory of mind: challenges and 
prospects
I shall ground my further arguments on the views of the 
British psychologist and philosopher of mind Ullin Thomas 
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Place (1920-2000). He states that empirical evidence is of 
critical importance for sustaining of a thesis in the MBD (7). 
Contrastingly to Davidson, Searle, Putnam, Kim or Church-
lands, he used to be a practicing clinical psychologist for 
NHC throughout a period of 40 years. Hence Place had clear 
penetration into the obvious miss-understanding between the 
neuroscientists and the mental health care operators. They use 
theoretically diverse terms to indicate actually identical events 
in mental life corresponding to processes in the brain. I shall 
also refer to another critical construct for my analysis: the 
“perfect correlation” goal as stated elsewhere (8). So I believe 
that if patterns of “perfect correlation” are established at least 
for some of the mental-neural phenomena, this entails a type 
of identity, which may serve to improve the cooperation of the 
experts in the field of mental health.
      I do not intend to construe a prior discussion as constitut-
ing an attempt to establish these forms of physicalism (type 
or token identity) as necessarily right. Rather I construe my 
prior analysis as determining these forms as plausible com-
bined predominant group of project solutions of the mind 
brain problem. Briefly, I intend to set them as: (i) Relevant to 
the evidence of the modern neuroscience, and (ii) as feasible 
cognitive explanatory vehicle that can reinforce „materialism 
as a scientific hypothesis“ (7). In summary my goal is to dem-
onstrate a cognitive ‘route’ for heuristic and pluralistic way 
of solution of the mind-brain problem in efficient dialogue 
with neuroscience.
     Originally, the type identity theory of mind was grounded 
on a group of evidence from experimental and clinical neu-
roscience, the excitation of the c-fibers in the nervous system 
correlated with the psychic experience of pain, contrastingly 
to the excitation of the A delta fibers as a correlate of the mere 
reception of the pain. Moreover a variety of other considera-
tions were raised from empirical material, such as the evidence 
of the ‘blind-sight’; prefrontal lobotomy; administration of 
Lysergic acid diethylamide and other biological agents induc-
ing changes in experience and behavior. 
    As far as many authors define and understand the issue of 
psychophysical identity in their own manner, let me try to 
summarize my assumption for this subject of analysis. Mental 
states (processes and events) do correlate in time and space 
with brain processes (or events - dependent on the experimental 
paradigm). This assumption seems not to be challenged so far. 
One may find it appropriate to specify that these correlations 
are revealed in humans (and mammals) in one possible reality 
(world) to be assessed by certain methods. These limitations 
as introduced by Putnam and other anti-reductionists actually 
serve to delineate some features of feasibility the identity or 
any other robust physicalist thesis. Still the implication of 
the anti-reductionists goes far beyond such denomination of 
‘feasibility’. They use the idea that mental states might be 
composed of different elements in another possible reality as 
argument to undermine and deny the very foundations of the 
strict physicalism. There is made an attempt in this Dance 
Round to demonstrate how meta-empirical analysis may 
question this approach. This entails the conclusion that whilst 
materialism in some of its modern expressions still underpins 
the constructions of psychiatry and psychology as robust scien-
tific disciplines, dualism and the radical forms of materialism 
remain of metaphysical significance without correspondence 
to the practical and scientific reality.
       Another contested facet in the identity theory of mind is 
the role of causality. It is the causal implication made from 
brain processes to mental phenomena and backwards which 
delineates the distinctions between the different kinds of 
physicalist theories of mind. I consolidate these two points to 
argue why dualism and epiphenomenalism (6) and eliminative 
materialism (9) are false as well.
Further I shall define the range of the plausible pluralistic ac-
count of mind brain problem has been limited to identity theory 
of mind and supervenience. Finally I shall employ Thornton’s 
critical account on supervenience as incapable to capture the 
‘interface problem’ to further converge the field of possible 
project solutions of the mind-body problem.
In his 1960 paper “Materialism as a scientific hypothesis” 
U.T. Place writes:
“What is important is that there must be some logical 
criteria which we use in deciding whether two sets of 
correlated observations refer to the same event or to two 
separate but causally related events. The problem of de-
ciding what these criteria are is a logical problem which 
cannot be decided by experiment in any ordinary sense of 
the term; and since we cannot be certain that the criteria 
are satisfied in the case of sensations and brain-processes 
unless we know what the criteria are, the issue is to that 
extent a philosophical issue […] …but let us assume that 
the identity of things is established empirically, while the 
identity of concepts is established either deductively … 
or empirically, as in the case of temperature and molecular 
motion, by the empirical verification of a scientific theory 
within which it is possible to define one concept in terms 
of the other. I prefer to regard the temperature, lightning, 
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and sensation-brain-process cases as examples of a special 
variety of the identity of things in which an identity is as-
serted between a state, process, or event and the micro-
processes of which it is composed.”
That is the precise original formulation of the type-type identity 
of mind-and-brain. In his earlier paper entitled “Is conscious-
ness a brain process?” Place examines logical and meta-
linguistic aspects of identity. He believes that compositional 
identity refers to the logical distinction introduced by Gilbert 
Ryle between the ‘is’ of definition and ‘is’ of composition. 
Place specifies that in his reflection of identity he actually 
refers to the compositional identity. Further Place introduces 
another cognitive limitation. He argues in his analysis, again 
in the sense of the Oxford School that there is substantial 
difference between events, states and processes and the type 
identity is valid only in the case of statements about mental 
events and brain processes. That means that identity thesis is 
applied to e.g. events of sensations and distributed processes 
in the brain. It is an important point to be emphasized. His-
torical predecessors if identity such as Pierre Cabanis in the 
late XIX century and some more radical reductionists of the 
XX century like Smart, Armstrong and Feyarabend do not 
share any cognitive limitations to their convictions  of reduc-
tion. Very often they are simply looking at anatomical loci of 
certain aspect of consciousness. This is the exact proposition 
that Place is arguing contra (7):
“…But the empirical problem is not, as Smart seems to 
think, simply a matter of determining the precise ana-
tomical location of this physiological process. It is still an 
open question whether there is, even in this relatively 
circumscribed area, a process which satisfies the logical 
criteria required to establish its identity with the sensation 
process. Even assuming that we know what these criteria 
are and are satisfied that they are applicable in this case, 
we cannot regard the question as finally settled until a 
process satisfying the necessary criteria has been discov-
ered or until we are sure that we know enough about the 
brain to be certain that no such process exists. Until such 
time as this issue is settled by further psycho-physiological 
research, materialism remains an empirical hypothesis – 
the hypothesis that there exists, presumably in the brain, 
a physiological process which satisfies the logical criteria 
required to establish its identity…” [1960 ibid]
Hence, Place assumes explanation of mental phenomena in 
terms of biology in the same way as lightning is seen as electric 
discharge or heat as a molecular motion. There is a crucial 
question raised besides the explanatory relation of the lower 
level models (brain processes) to construction of the psyche, 
which seems “self-evident” according to Place himself. Most 
philosophers of mind will not rule out some kind of emergence. 
The actual question addresses the ontological or translational 
reduction. If one may eventually agree that higher level (whole 
person) experiences are undoubtedly composed of lower level 
(neuronal) processes, most of the identity theory opponents 
disagree whether the person level in composed only and ex-
clusively of neural processes. The position of the ontological 
reduction is that not only specific process in the brain causes 
certain experience or behavior on the personal level but more 
importantly the backwards implication, namely that every 
certain type of mental phenomenon to one and the same brain 
process. Therefore the claim of reduction is inextricably bound 
to the claim of the causal power. In the intuition of the theorists 
of mind-brain identity as well as of the other types of reductive 
materialism mentality has no causal potential in itself at all. 
This implies over-determination of the mental from physical. 
The configuration essentially excludes any potential causal 
capacity of the mental hence any autonomy of human behavior 
and consciousness in general. In my perspective this should 
be one genuine subject of the debate. As it has been outlined 
by Kenneth S. Kendler:
“That is, changes in the brain can directly affect mental 
Functioning…we commit ourselves to the concept 
ofmind-to-brain causality. In ways we can observe but 
not yet fully understand, subjective, first-person mental 
phenomena have causal efficacy in the world. They affect 
our brains and our bodies and through them the outside 
world.” (Am J Psychiatry 2005; 162:433– 440)
It is also worth mentioning here that the ‘classical’ identity 
theory of mind as presented by Place does not take part in 
the debate of the causation at all. The assignment of causal 
power to the neural correlates of consciousness is an exclusive 
merit of the later identity theorists like David Armstrong. My 
own understanding is that we have not sufficient evidence to 
take a sound position on the causation of mentality and thus 
we should embrace the pragmatic bi-directional causation 
as proposed by Kendler and later supported with robust data 
from neuroscience.
The other genuine subject to debate should be the issue of 
translational vs. ontological reduction. One of the outstand-
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ing proponents of the identity theory Jack Smart is inclined 
to believe that the ontological reduction is an ultimate goal:
“…I should say that this is an ontological, not a translational 
physicalism. It would be absurd to try to translate sen-
tences containing the word ‘brain’ or the word ‘sensation’ 
into sentences about electrons, protons and so on.” (10)
This is not however only way in which we understand or 
interpret the notion of translation. In some perspective ‘trans-
lational’ properties of given phenomena are seen not just as 
a linguistic issue, but mainly as epistemological one. When 
I say epistemological I imply the justification of the use of 
inter-disciplinary shared terms and notions. Now imagine 
that a term like “emotions” is frequently employed in many 
disciplinary systems, such as psychology, psychopathology, 
and neurosciences. Therefore “emotions” is a shared construct 
with all derivative terms which are used to describe human 
experiences in health and disease, e.g. “depression” or “anger”, 
“grief” and so forth.  Disciplines which seem to employ this 
wide range of terminology are ascribed to explain different 
levels in mind-brain relationships, both vertical and horizontal. 
Vertical relations of biological properties and mental phenom-
ena are subject to comprehensive interest and examination. 
My intuition is that there exists another kind of important 
horizontal structures in mental health knowledge which require 
consistent translation. We can define and understand the realm 
of mentality of its own right but any cognitive structure in it 
(regularity or notion representing certain aspects of conscious-
ness) has to be underpinned with correspondent (identical in 
Boring’s sense of correlation) cognitive structure in the realm 
of neural processes
Let me try to illustrate this configuration. It is used one 
provisional example on the following picture  with two dif-
ferent classes of mental and respective neural phenomena, 
where A stands for realm of mentality and B stands for realm 
of neural processes (Fig. 1). 
My claim is that no connection at the level of mentality (not 
equivalent to intentional realm in McDowelian’s terminology) 
may exist if it is not underpinned by a corresponding connec-
tion at neural level or in the neural domain. In other words, in 
the rectangular structure as illustrated above not only its basic 
elements (the items in the separate angles) are connected with 
bridge laws, but the very laws (both vertical and horizontal) 
are ‘stabilized’ by homological bridges, say isomorphic lines 
of connection. This does not necessarily imply that anything 
in mind-brain relationships is governed under such rules. I 
suggest this configuration just for the ‘scientific’ descriptions 
of observable phenomena which claim to be ‘evidence’ both 
in neuroscience and psychology and hence need to face the 
respective demands for scientific stability (reliability) and 
inter-disciplinary validity. In this sense I have no claim at 
such robust structures when it concerns the values and trans-
personal relationships at the level of the whole person and 
intentionality. This is consistent with other similar views 
on the construction of mentality. This is to some extent the 
case with Psycho-biological theory of personality of Claude 
Robert Cloninger (11). He defines two integrative domains 
of personality. One of them is explicitly underpinned with 
neuro-biological and genetic mechanisms and is named tem-
perament; it is connected closely to other biologically derived 
concepts such as Eysenck’s theory of personality (including 
e.g. neuroticism and extroversion as personality traits). The 
other domain is related to the character and specifically to 
‘humanistic and trans-personal style’ of communication and 
relating to others. The latter domain explores such aspects of 
personal profile Self-directednes, Cooperativeness and Self-
transcendence which obviously belong to the intentional realm. 
Self-transcendence becomes later the basis of Cloninger’s 
‘science of well being’. My intuition is that there is a variety 
of other mental phenomena besides the ‘temperament’ in the 
terms of Cloninger which correspond to causal substrate in the 
brain and thus are liable to translational reduction. Still there 
are a number of other irreducible intentional entities which 
transcend beyond my configuration and which are therefore 
outside the frontiers of this analysis. These entities belong to 
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the realm of socio-cultural values; whilst my deep concern as 
it has been outlined in the introduction is within the realm of 
facts (or evidence).
In the following section I shall further defend identity theory 
from two extreme forms of reductive physicalism as well as 
from some anti-reductionist responses.
Eliminative materialism and epiphenomenalism are 
false
Two more radical theories in the convergent field of project 
solutions of the mind-brain problem are regarded as influential 
in the past two decades. These are epiphenomenalism and 
eliminative materialism.
Objections at eliminative materialism
One of leading proponents of eliminative materialism Paul M. 
Churchland (9) asserts that:
“The identity theory was called into doubt not because 
the prospects for a materialist account of our mental ca-
pacities were thought to be poor, but because it seemed 
unlikely that the arrival of an adequate materialist theory 
would bring with it the nice one-to-one match-ups, be-
tween the concepts of folk psychology and the concepts 
of theoretical neuroscience, that intertheoretic reduction 
requires. The reason for that doubt was the great variety 
of quite different physical systems that could instantiate 
the required functional organization. Eliminative material-
ism also doubts that the correct neuroscientific account 
of human capacities will produce a neat reduction of our 
common-sense framework, but here the doubts arise from 
a quite different source.
As the eliminative materialists see it, the one-to-one 
match-ups will not be found, and our common-sense 
psychological framework will not enjoy an intertheoretic 
reduction, because our common-sense psycholological 
framework is a false and radically misleading concep-
tion of the causes of human behavior and the nature of 
cognitive activity. On this view, folk psychology is not just 
an incomplete representation of our inner natures; it is 
an outright activities. Consequently, we cannot expect a 
truly adequate neuroscientific account of our inner lives 
to provide theoretical categories that match up nicely 
with the categories of our commonsense framework. 
Accordingly, we must expect that the older framework 
will simply be eliminated, rather than be reduced, by a 
matured neuroscience”.
My objections at Churchland’s vision are twofold.  The first 
one is the subscription to the construct of fuzzy and indefi-
nite construct of “folk” or “commonsense psychology”. This 
commitment is not unusual in philosophy of psychology and 
psychiatry even in contemporary pieces of research (12). 
Eliminative materialism regards “folk psychology” as fuzzy 
and indefinite and therefore hopes that ‘matured neuroscience’ 
complemented with computational technologies can eliminate 
it. Nonetheless I stress that the very notion of folk psychology 
is delineated in a fuzzy and indefinite way and we have not 
specific borderline between what is assumed as „folk psychol-
ogy“ and what serves as ‚scientific psychology“ (cognitive, 
clinical etc) and that is not justified in Churchlands‘ claim.
My worry however is also that such stipulation does not 
help to improve the standards for ‘scientific’ psychology and 
hence psychiatry. Although some authors assume the ex-
trapolation of the issues from folk to cognitive psychology as 
possible and necessary (13) this is also a kind of ‘piecemeal’ 
approach to the constitution of evidence in areas of mental 
health knowledge claiming at scientific value of their data. 
Second, many branches of psychology and psychiatry (clini-
cal, behavioral, cognitive etc.) insist on their commitment to 
positive science. There is collected considerable evidence 
in these frameworks. Although it is criticized for the limited 
trans-disciplinary capacity of the cognitive content (14, 15) 
it meets some ‘internal’ criteria for validity for different rea-
sons like utility (16). This means that we are less concerned 
with the internal validity but the capacity for ‘translation’ of 
data between different disciplinary languages. Hence we are 
concerned more in patterns of identity therefore of correla-
tions of mind-and-brain activities than in complete denial 
of all contemporary psychological knowledge as proposed 
by Churchland, regardless whether it is “commonsense” or 
“scientific”. Second, eliminative materialism is much more 
precise that the ultimate replacement of the overall “mental’ 
vocabulary is on its way. They tend to believe without any 
hint at reservation that every single construct of psychology 
is to be replaced with neuro-computational categories. Whilst 
Place seems to be much more cautious in his predictions (em-
phasized and underlined in the quotations in this essay) that 
materialism is nothing but a ‘scientific hypothesis” and that 
just a certain class of mental constructs are liable to reduction. 
He is inclined to accept that there is also a class of irreducible 
entities, a view I completely share with him. I have developed 
a couple of case studies to endorse this point herewith.
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Case study:
Thesis : identity of the pain experience with the c-fibres activation : a claim for possibility of universal explanatory reduction.
Anti-thesis:
(a) “false” pain: many survivors after limb amputation report pain experience from the area of the the same limb that has been 
eliminated;
(b) Kandinsky-de Clerambault syndrome, sensory type: patients inform about senstaions (very often pain sensations) without 
any activation of c-fibers. Two worries emerge: what determines the pain experience in De Clerambault s-me and where is the 
causal connection of the mind-and-brain complexity?
Case report 1: Sasho V., 50 years old
Hospitalization (July 2007) of a patient with depressive-paranoid syndrome, basically assessed a recurrent depression with 
elements oh hypochondria.
Extraction from the narrative from the last interview (Oct 30th, 2007):
“I felt aches...initially I thought I’ve got a cancer. When the pains begin (puts his arms around the epigastria  and the lateral abdominal 
area)...it is just something glowing, sometimes very hard and embarrassing, than gradually faded...eventually I felt pain in the chest 
on the left side...like a heartache. It pressed and released, usually in the evening. Maybe it was caused by some kind of exterior power, 
influence from outside, like magic.”
The numerous instrumental explorations, including EMG did not prove any organic cause for Sasho’s complaints as well as 
there were revealed no data, associated with C-fibers excitation. On the other hand he responded to antipsychotic treatment.
Case report 2: Stefan S., 55 years old
Serial hospitalization in the clinic; this particular one - by the reason of
a legal expertise.
According to the morbid anamnesis it refers a case of schizophrenia in a stage of evolution of a paraphernia syndrome.
The latter is presented with pseudo-hallucinatory phenomena as well as with confabulatory megalomania signs and inven-
tory delusions.
The further analysis of the pseudo-hallucinatory component shows that the patient shared experiences like aches in the 
internal organs.
Extract form the interview: 
 “…I am a great inventor, I created inventions for billions dollars. The foreign intelligence services prosecute me and want to destroy 
me… three men follow me with little machines implanted into my organs. They intend to hurt me – inducing undefined internal and 
of the left hand pain ”, caused by “extra-sensorial equipment”.
The investigation of the periphery segment of the pain sensor with EEG and EMG did not prove any excitation in the extra-
lemniscal system.
Imaging techniques are not available in order to explore the CNS pain-related structures and function.
Synthesis:
(a) central, not peripheral activity of the neural system causes the pain sesnsation; pragmatic reductionism; bi-directional 
causation according to Kendler (2005) and Korf (2009)
(b) distributed functional systems involved, not local structure interactions,
(c) organo-dynamic dissolution of the higher mental functions, “liberation” of the archaic ones: e.g. automatisms in the sensory 
modality (pain perception).
In conclusion: (a) explanatory pluralism is necessary in the case, in combination with (b) token identity, applied to mental 
phenomena, already explored by the neuroscience and (c) supervenience to the ones, which nature is not clarified yet. (d) 
Psychopathological phenomena might be explained through organo-dynamic theory (H.Ey, 1962). 
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Last but not least in my revision of the identity theory, as in-
dicated above. I attempt to say that identity has a ‘horizontal’ 
meaning besides the obvious ‘vertical’ implication. In this 
horizontal perspective there is no such demand at replace-
ment of the vocabulary. Each of the languages in question is 
a nomothetic system of its own right, mental and physical, 
but we are aware of their correspondence (Bohring’s) perfect 
correlation, and each expert operating with these languages is 
prepared for the inter-playability of the terminology employed 
in his discipline. Put in other words the upgrade of identity 
theory of mind is a prototype of a ‚manual for translation’. 
Ruling out epiphenomenalism
The other radical theory of mind advocating a heavy reduc-
tionist program is epiphenomenalism. I am inclined to rule 
it out as well. As it has been articulated by Ken Kendler (6):
“The core assertion of epiphenomenalism is that the 
mental world is without causal efficacy, our mental life 
being simply froth on the wave or steam from the en-
gine. Thoughts, feelings, and impulses occur within our 
subjective experience, but they do nothing. All the causal 
action occurs at the level of brain function. For the present 
purposes, I wish to simply assert its falsity and argue that 
thoughts, feelings, and impulses matter not only because 
they are responsible for huge amounts of human suffering 
but because they do things.”
In later studies this point has been confirmed empirically in 
the continuous contributions of Jacob Korf, who demonstrated 
experimentally that mental experience, though generated by 
electric activity of the brain, can also affect brain function 
by top-down causation. Korf has illuminated that the signal 
detected via neuro-imaging techniques (like PET or fMRI) is 
actually the restorative iso-energetic response of the neural 
networks after performance of certain mental activity, i.e. it 
comes as an effect from, not as a cause for the psychic phe-
nomena (17, 18) . 
Commentary on some anti-reductionism assumptions
I shall try to explain herewith why a large body of criticism 
of the identity theory of mind is inappropriate in the con-
text of philosophy of psychiatry. Three critical objections 
targeted: presented by Davidsson, Putnam and Kripke (e.g. 
19). The ‘multiple reliability” or ‘Twin Earth” arguments are 
among the most cited anti-reductionist points along with the 
anomalous monism of Davidsson and Kripke’s argument. All 
three critical assertions are well known in the philosophy of 
psychiatry literature and have been exposed in an extensive 
analysis (and still there is discarded the critical role of the 
identity theory of mind).  This is why I shall not go in-depth 
with their reproduction but present just a brief disagreement. 
It is precisely that any of these anti-reductionist accounts is 
inevitably leading into metaphysical confusion. If unfold the 
most common anti-reductionist statements lead either into 
some form of psychophysical dualism or directly into idealistic 
monism. These two specific positions in MBD, though perhaps 
significant in themselves for philosophy are not relevant to 
the modern evidence of neuroscience and can not contribute 
to the “philosophy-into-practice” perspective as mentioned 
earlier.  In fact they are grounded on completely speculative 
assumptions such as the possibility of the existence of another 
parallel reality in the “Twin Earth” thinking experiment by 
Hillary Putnam. In my understanding philosophy of psychiatry 
(including philosophy of mind in the same context) have not 
to consider ‘multiple’ realities and mental organizations. It is 
implied by the very subject of the mental disorder as some-
thing concerning human mentality in this world. This does not 
mean that I am rejecting the significance of these arguments in 
general philosophy of mind and analytic philosophy. 
Toward a revised identity theory of mind
In previous sections I have danced round my view that there 
is a “horizontal” aspect of the identity thesis which is not that 
committed to the reduction vs. emergence debate as is the 
“vertical” identity. My implication for the update of the identity 
theory of mind looks like that: “we have two measures, e.g. 
clinical assessment depression rating scale and neurobiologi-
cal measurement of some brain process, e.g. binding potential 
for some causally efficient for depression brain protein. If we 
explore them simultaneously we shall reveal unquestionable 
convergence between the two scores: depression scale will 
correspond to some equipotent value of the brain measure.” 
(20) Identity thesis as defined by Boring seems to be consistent:
„... a perfect correlation is identity. Two events that always 
occur together at the same time in the same place, without 
any temporal or spatial differentiation at all, are not two 
events but the same event. The mind-body correlations as 
formulated at present do not admit of spatial correlation, 
so they reduce to matters of simple correlation in time. The 
need for identification is no less urgent in this case“ (8).
My tentative argument is that the modern neuroscience disre-
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gards the critical importance of the concordance of the time 
correlation (currently the brain scans are performed in different 
time and in different space from the clinical evaluation) and so 
to claim that improvement of the methodological framework 
and protocols will possibly help us to demonstrate at least 
some patterns (or ‘patchy reduction’in the terms of Kendler) 
of mind-brain identity. There is positive predicative evidence 
that we shall succeed at least in part of this program.
If we do then the issue is raised what will be the impact 
of the established models of identity. Modern mental and 
neuroscience hold respectively implicit transactionist dualism 
and eliminative materialism positions. Eventually we shall 
discover that such terribly diverse constructs in modern neu-
ropsychiatry as paranoia in psychoanalysis (tacit dualism) and 
neuro-physiology (tacit eliminativism) are in fact identical. I.e. 
we have different implications of one term in diverse branches 
of mental health knowledge (diverse in the sense of their tacit 
position in the MBD which proves to be in fact identical in 
different disciplinary languages, if bridged with cross-validity 
law-like translational structures. In turn this may facilitate the 
reconciliation of the paradigms in the field.
Is there any room left for supervenience?
Further we need to address one more query. Namely whether 
there is any room left for the supervenience theory of mind. 
I need supervenience applied to other mental phenomena, 
because of two reasons. The one is that, as it is stated specifi-
cally by Place (7) type identity refers to mental events and 
neural processes in the terms of Gilbert Ryle. I still need some 
explanatory framework for the mental processes and states, 
respectively neural events and states. Because of the higher 
level of complexity, which characterizes these kinds of rela-
tionships, type identity is not appropriate as explanatory model. 
However supervenience delivers some, let me say broader 
„periphrasis“ of the reductive physicalism, which is feasible 
to fill in these gaps, so that they may remain protected against 
the speculations of the dualism or even of the epiphenomenal-
ism. At the same time we need to be cautious in subscribing to 
supervenience. In his recent study of the interface problem as 
defined by Bermudez Thornton (21) for instance argues that:
“… non-reductionist supervenience is not a stable middle 
point between a form of dualism that eschews superveni-
ence or a reductionist physicalism that can also explain 
supervenience. That in turn suggests that supervenience 
cannot…provide a deflationary resolution of the interface 
problem”.
In other words supervenience seems not to offer comprehen-
sive ontological resolution of the mind-brain problem. This 
is why I prefer to operationally employ supervenience as well 
as the weak forms of reductive physicalism (e.g. token iden-
tity and ‘patchy reductionism’) in order to deliver pluralistic 
explanatory account of the more sophisticated and complex 
phenomena of the mental life as exemplified in the case studies 
in the previous section. 
On the role of connectivity or the “bridge laws” 
in science as applied to the connections between 
neuroscience and psychiatry
Identity theory of mind as well as any form of reduction in 
science is inextricably bound to the construct of the so called 
bi-conditional Nagelian laws. Ernest Nagel (22) gives a spe-
cific definition for the role of reduction:
“…Reduction, in the sense in which the word is here 
employed, is the explanation of a theory or a set of ex-
perimental laws established in one area of inquiry, by a 
theory usually though not invariably formulated for some 
or other domain. “
Nagel distinguishes two types of reductions: (i) Homogene-
ous reductions: relations between two sets of statements  that 
employ a homogeneous vocabulary, and (ii) Inhomogeneous 
reductions, where the subject matter of the primary science 
appears to be qualitatively discontinuous with the materials 
studied by the secondary science. 
By all evidence wherever there exist psychophysical 
reductions bolstered by an updated identity theory of mind 
as exposed above, they should be a type of inhomogeneous 
connections between mental and physical terms and law-like 
structures (see 2.2. and 2.5.) According to the Nagelian con-
cept, the nature of bridge-laws (the assumptions that assure 
connect ability) might be construed in three different ways: 
logical connections (ruled out be Nagel himself); conventions 
and factual or material connections (empirical connections). 
As we are aware since Hempel and Spitzer the logical connec-
tions along with conventions delineate the modern ‘scientific 
psychiatry’. 
Many studies have demonstrated that in practice this ap-
proach is to a great extent misleading and proto-scientific. My 
claim is that the bridge laws between psychiatry and neurosci-
ence should be underpinned with factual connections based on 
real findings of clinical sciences and neuro-biology in health 
and disorder. Last but not least, a reservation in the adoption of 
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the Nageliean concept should be made. On one hand it seems 
to me inevitable to adopt bridge psychophysical laws where we 
have sufficient evidence to sustain them in order to establish 
patterns of identity and thus predispose reconciliation between 
paradigms in mental health. On the other I do not embrace 
Nagel’s demand for ontological elimination of the reduced 
entities besides the most basic sciences (neuro-biochemistry 
in our case). I see no sensible need in this ultimate reduction 
from the angle of the cognitive pluralism. Also in the light 
of my previous arguments a program for ultimate reduction 
(like those proposed by the eliminative materialism and epi-




Psychiatry definitely must focus on the personal experience 
and values. The person centered comprehensive assessment 
however needs to be the superstructure over a more robust 
scientific basis. The individual assessment is always unstable 
as it is unique for every person. That’s why I regard it is a kind 
of superstructure, which should be grounded on a preliminary 
fundamental transdisciplinary structure of knowledge, stabi-
lized with cross-validity “bridging” connections in the network 
of the basic explanatory sciences about mind-and-brain.
As an interdiscipline, psychiatry should meet the criteria 
for internal validity but also for independent external valid-
ity. This is why it needs cross-validation of its shared terms 
and methods with neuroscience. At the same time neurosci-
ence is not likely to deliver evidence about the validity of the 
contemporary narrow categories in mental health. It is more 
likely that neurobiology can further validate broad diagnostic 
prototypes. Once stable prototypes are validated via explana-
tory connections from psychology (the group of ‘mind’ or 
‘mental’ sciences) and neurobiology (the group of ‘brain’ or 
‘neurosciences’) we can superstructure them with the personal 
narratives. 
In summary, I propose a frame shift from mind-brain op-
position (controversy) to mind-and-brain unity without the 
eliminativist claim for ultimate reduction and with due respect 
to the personal experience and values. 
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